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ABSTRACT

This paper first documents the decades-long erosion of the link between low wages and low
household income. It then simulates the consequences of this determination on the relative gains of
programs designed to help the working poor—minimum wage increases under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Using data from the Current Population Survey it
is found that increases in the EITC between 1989 and 1992 were far more target-efficient than was the
increase in the minimum wage from $3.35 to $4.25 and that the 1993 extension of the EITC is far more
target-efficient than raising the minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.00. The paper concludes that the EITC
is a far more effective mechanism for targeting low income workers than are increases in the minimum
wage.
This study was funded by the Employment Policies Institute, Washington, DC. The authors,
however, take full responsibility for its findings. The authors thank T. Aldrich Finegan for comments
on previous drafts of this paper.
Richard V. Burkhauser is Professor of Economics and Associate Director for Aging Studies
Program, Center for Policy Research, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University. Andrew J. Glenn is a
graduate student at Vanderbilt University who is writing his dissertation on labor market issues.
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PUBLIC POLICIES FOR THE WORKING POOR:
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT VERSUS
MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION

Half a century ago the best medical practice for a child with pneumonia was aspirin, fluids,
and plenty of prayer. The development of antibiotics would make that same treatment the subject of a
major malpractice suit today. Similarly the establishment of a minimum wage to lift the children of
the working poor out of poverty was "best practice" social policy in the 1930s. But the advent of the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) makes advocates of a rise in the minimum wage as a means of helping the
children of today's working poor equally guilty of social policy malpractice.
In this paper we first document the decades-long erosion of the link between low wages and low
household income which makes minimum wage legislation in the 1990s an exceptionally ineffective
mechanism for helping poor working families. We demonstrate the consequences of this deterioration by
simulating how the benefits of the 1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (which increased the
minimum wage from $3.35 per hour to its current level of $4.25 per hour) were distributed. This
increase in the minimum wage increased earnings by $4.2 billion. We find that upper income households—
defined here as households with incomes at least three times the poverty level ($14,343 for a family of
four in 1992)—benefitted more from that minimum wage increase than did poor families. While
households below the poverty line received 17 percent of the increased earnings from the higher
minimum wage, upper income households received more than twice as much. We compare these results with
the increases in the EITC between 1989 and 1992—a change also costing $4.2 billion—which provided
three of every ten of those dollars to poor families with children—almost double the effect from the
minimum wage, most of the rest to near poor families, and virtually nothing to upper income households.
Second, we move to current legislative initiatives and trace the income distribution
implications of the 1993 expansion of the EITC. We show that by 1996, after all its components are put
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in place, two-thirds of the $11 billion cost of this program will go to workers who live in poor or
near-poor families. In contrast, only 27 percent of the benefits of an increase in the current minimum
wage from $4.25 to $5.00 would go to workers who live in poor or near-poor families. We conclude that
the link between low wages and low income is so remote that increases in the minimum wage are an
outmoded and ineffective mechanism for helping the working poor and should be abandoned in favor of the
EITC.
The Minimum Wage and the Working Poor
Franklin Roosevelt's impassioned speech calling Congress to help the one-third of Americans
who were "ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished" heralded the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
with it a national minimum wage (Roosevelt, 1937). This Act marked the culmination of a long struggle
by social reformers to establish the constitutional right of legislatures to set work rules and
marshall the political support to pass such legislation at the national level.
Echoes of that speech can still be heard today. Senator Edward Kennedy (1989:S14707), in his
criticism of the meagerness of the last increase in the minimum wage, declared that

the minimum wage was, as it should be, a living wage, for working men and women...who are
attempting to provide for their families, feed and clothe their children, heat their
homes, [and] pay their mortgages. The cost-of-living inflation adjustments since 1981
would put the minimum wage at $4.79 today, instead of the $4.25 it will reach on April 1,
1991. That is a measure of how far we have failed the test of fairness to the working
poor.

These two speeches bound one-half of a century over which the minimum wage has not only been a
litmus test for politicians seeking the support of organized labor, but has been seen by the public at
large as a socially just exercise of government regulatory power. In a July 20, 1993 memorandum to
President Clinton, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich appears to once again take up the banner of the
minimum wage by declaring: "It is now time to investigate what minimum wage reforms may be appropriate
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... To achieve the goals of making work pay, the minimum wage should be raised and then indexed" (as
quoted in The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 1993).
The crusade for minimum wage and maximum-hours legislation spans the entire Twentieth Century,
and its continued support is based in part on the important legal and political precedents its
establishment created. Resistance to the minimum wage first centered over its constitutionality. The
nineteenth-century view that the right to contract was part of the liberty protected by the 14th
Amendment, and that the right to purchase or sell labor could only be abrogated by legislatures on very
narrow grounds, received perhaps its strongest judicial endorsement in Lochner v. New York (198. U.S.
45 (1905)). In that case the Supreme Court nullified a New York State law establishing maximum hours
of work. In time the dissent espoused by Oliver Wendell Holmes in that case—that legislatures could
regulate such contracts so long as the regulations were reasonable—prevailed. However, it was not
until West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish (300, U.S. 379 (1937)), that the Supreme Court first upheld a
state law that established a minimum wage, and that was for women only. The Court held that "the
legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the "sweating system," the
exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living..."
Thus, by 1938 popular support for the minimum wage was based not only on its potential to
provide a living wage for the working poor, but by a growing majority who believed that legislatures
could and should actively intervene in the marketplace to correct perceived social injustice.
Once it was established that legislatures had the power to set minimum wages, the debate moved
to who should be covered and at what level. Opposition centered around the position taken by the great
majority of economists that a minimum wage set above the competitive market wage would reduce
employment of the workers it was designed to help. These economic points were first formally
summarized in Stigler (1946) and consist of now standard resource misallocation and loss of employment
arguments. Stigler's policy message was that the minimum wage has an uncertain effect on the working
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poor. Those low-wage workers who keep their jobs are helped by the minimum wage, while those who lose
them or who are not hired are harmed.
More than four decades of empirical studies leave little doubt that increases in the minimum
wage reduce employment to some extent.1 (See Wessels (1980); Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982); and Brown
(1988) for reviews of the literature on the employment effects of minimum wages.) Yet it is unlikely
that the losses are large enough to end public support, although concern over teenage unemployment did
play a role in the establishment of a sub-minimum wage in the 1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Rather, it is the message in the latter part of Stigler's article—questioning the
target efficiency of the minimum wage and advocating an alternative remedial policy—that may finally
end the use of minimum wage policy as a means of helping the working poor.
The essence of Stigler's argument made in 1946 was that "the connection between hourly wages
and the standard of living of a family is remote and fuzzy" (Stigler, 1946, p. 363). Hence, he argued
that earning a low wage may not be synonymous with living in a low income household. The reason is that
household income depends not only on the wage rate of a given worker in a household, but also on that
person's hours worked; the wages and hours worked of other household members; income from other
sources; and the number of people in the household. Unfortunately, Stigler offered little empirical
evidence to support this claim. In an earlier series of papers, discussed below, Burkhauser and
Finegan have brought important new evidence on this issue to light.
The Tenuous Link Between Low Wages and Poverty
From its inception in 1939 until the mid-1980s, the minimum wage fluctuated between 45 and 56
percent of the average private-sector wage, where the average private-sector wage is defined as the
gross average hourly earnings of all production and nonsupervisory workers in the private nonfarm
sector, based on payroll data, reported by employers to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 1981, the
minimum wage stood at 46 percent of average wages but trended down thereafter and hit a low of about 37
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percent in the year prior to the passage of the 1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. In
1992 it was about 42 percent of the average private-sector wage.
In the first half of the Twentieth Century, when the typical household had only one worker and
when social programs to assist low income households were scarce, a low wage might directly translate
into a low household income. But in the 1990s this translation is much "fuzzier." This changing
relationship between low-wage workers and household income is shown in Table 1, which builds on the
work in Burkhauser and Finegan (1989). Since one aim of minimum wage advocates is to peg the minimum
wage at 50 percent of the average private-sector wage,2 we have defined a low-wage worker as one whose
wages fall below that 50 percent threshold.3
Our measure of economic well-being is the income-to-needs ratio. Except in 1939, this is the
ratio of total household income to the official poverty line for the appropriate size household.
Values of the poverty line for different years were adjusted for changes in the consumer price index.
Unfortunately, the 1940 Census did not ask respondents how much income they received from sources
other than wages or salaries in 1939. Therefore, for that one year, our measure of well being is the
ratio of the household's wage or salary earnings to its poverty level. This omission will have more of
an impact at higher levels of earnings than at lower levels.
Column 1 of Table 1 relates income to the official poverty line. A low-wage worker living in a
household with income below the poverty line would be found in the first row of Table 1. (In 1992 the
official federal government poverty line for a household of four was $14,343.) A low wage worker
living in a household with income three or more times the poverty line—$43,029 for a family of four in
1992—would be in the "three or above" row.
In 1939, 85 percent of low wage workers lived below the poverty line. Almost all, 94 percent,
of low-wage workers who were also head of households lived in a poor household. None lived in a
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household with income at least three times the poverty line. Not only were low wage workers very
likely poor, their chances of being poor were increased if they were the head of a household.4
Over the second half of the Twentieth Century the view that holding a low wage job is
synonymous with living in poverty has become much more difficult to justify. Low wage workers became
increasingly less likely to be poor, regardless of whether they headed a household. In 1969 less than
one-half (45 percent) of low wage heads of household lived in poverty. Twenty years later, only 37
percent of low wage heads did so. But the link between low wages and poverty is even more tenuous
because even in 1939 the great majority of low-wage workers were not heads of households but rather
second or third earners in those households. As can be seen in the bottom two rows of Table 1, in 1939,
34 percent of low-wage workers were heads of households and 31 percent were heads of poor households.
By 1989 only about one low-wage worker in five was a household head and less than one low-wage worker in
10 actually headed a poor household.
The New Deal image of low-wage workers struggling to earn a living for their families is as
poignant today as it was in the 1930s, but this image fails to describe today's typical low-wage
worker. As Table 1 shows, by 1989 only 8 percent of low-wage workers headed families living in
poverty.
For this reason it is useful to look at how all low-wage workers are positioned across the
income distributions, not just household heads. Once again Table 1 shows the weakening link between
low wages and low household income. In 1939 more than four out of five low wage workers (85 percent)
lived in poverty. By 1959 only two in five lived in poverty. A decade later the number was down to
about one in five, where it has remained. Even more important with respect to who is directly affected
by increases in the minimum wage; as late as 1959 a low-wage worker was four times as likely to live in
a poor household as in an upper income one (three times the poverty line or $43,029 for a household of
four in 1992); by 1989, the shares of low wage workers at the two extremes of the income distribution
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reversed so that a low-wage worker was 36 percent more likely to live in an upper income household than
in a poor one.
The explosion of jobs held by second and third workers in a household, the dramatic drop in the
poverty rate, and the greater availability of government transfer payments for lower income households
over the second half of the Twentieth Century have all eroded the connection between low wage jobs and
poverty.5
Table 2, which is updated from Burkhauser and Finegan (1993) uses the same data sources as
Table 1 to more formally show how tenuous the link between wages and household income has become. This
table presents a matrix of coefficients of determination6 (R2) between the hourly earnings of workers
in the bottom half of the wage distribution and their household income relative to the poverty line.
In Table 2, low-wage workers are classified by household status. In 1939, the first year the minimum
wage was put into effect, the correlation between the wages of household heads and their household's
income was .241—differences in the hourly wages of household heads explained 24 percent of the
difference in their household size-adjusted incomes in that year. By 1979 this correlation had fallen
by more than one-half. It rose slightly by 1989 but was still quite low. For other household members,
the dominant group of low wage workers, the relationship between their wage and their household's
income is much weaker since the earnings of the household head play such an important role in total
household income. Hence, in 1939 the R2 for this group was .204 and it dropped to one-fourth that level
by 1989—to 0.054. Because unrelated individuals live alone, one would expect the strong relationship
between their wage rate and their household income evidenced in Table 2. The correlation is
consistently three times or more that of heads and other household members. Household income, as
Stigler pointed out, is dependent on wage rate but also on hours worked, income of other household
members, non-wage income, and household size. In 1939, the first full year of federal minimum wage
enforcement, the correlation coefficient between the wage rate of all low wage earners and their
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household income was only .207. Whether such a correlation is "fuzzy" as Stigler asserted is open to
question. But as Table 2 shows, that correlation—which by 1989 had fallen to .053, only one-fourth its
1939 size—has gotten considerably fuzzier.
The end of the relationship between low wages and low household income has had a profound
affect on the ability of minimum wage increases to target additional income to the working poor. The
most recent increase in the minimum wage offers overwhelming proof of this reality.
Who Gained from the 1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act?
Most previous studies of the effect of the minimum wage have concentrated on estimating its
effects on employment. Few studies have examined the income distribution implications of an increase
in the minimum wage. (See Horrigan and Mincy (1992) for the most recent review of this literature.)
Rather, it has at least implicitly been assumed that such households were poor. As shown above, this
assumption has become increasingly unrealistic. In Table 3 we simulate how the earning gains from the
1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which increased the minimum wage from $3.35 to $4.25,
were allocated across households of different income.
Estimating Wages from CPS Data
There are two kinds of earnings data in the March 1990 file of the Current Population Survey
(CPS): retrospective data relating to the previous year (1989) and more exact data for March 1990. We
used the former to derive estimates of hourly wages and the number of low-wage workers that were
comparable to those obtained from the earlier censuses. These estimates appear in Tables 1 and 2. We
use the contemporaneous and more accurate earnings data in our estimation of the allocation of
benefits from changes in the minimum wage.
From outgoing rotation groups (one-quarter of the sample of households), each month's CPS
collects data on workers' usual gross weekly earnings in their primary job and how many hours per week
they usually work at that job. Workers who are paid by the hour are asked how much they earn per hour.
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These data are better suited than retrospective data for simulating the effects of a rise in the
minimum wage because no recollection of the previous year's labor earnings is required. For the ex
ante distribution of hourly labor earnings in our simulations, we used the reported hourly wage rate
for hourly paid workers and the ratio of usual weekly labor earnings to usual hours worked for others.
All income data, however, come from retrospective information from the previous year.
The 1989 Amendments took place in a two step process and were not fully put in place until 1991.
We simplify our analysis by focusing on the fully phased in value of the higher minimum wage and
abstracting from the two-step transition. Further, we assume that the minimum wage increase had no
effect on the number of workers employed or on the number of hours they worked. Hence, we ignore all
the negative employment effects of the minimum wage so often cited by economists. We further ignore
the economy-wide effects of an increase in the minimum wage on inflation, poverty thresholds, and on
the relative prices of goods and services consumed by the poor. Effects of higher earnings on personal
income taxes and on the receipt of transfer payments are also neglected. Hence, we believe our results
offer a best possible case for the advocates of an increase in the minimum wage.
We limit the impact of a higher minimum to those low-wage job holders who are covered by the law
by assuming that those workers earning less than $3.00 per hour were not covered.7 (For a fuller
discussion of our assumptions, see the Appendix.)
Column 2 of Table 3 shows that the last minimum wage increase cost employers and consumers of
their products $4.2 billion annually in added labor expenses. It also shows how those benefits were
distributed across households. By increasing the minimum wage, workers living in poverty were helped.
But, as can be seen in column 4 of Table 3, workers living in poor households received less than two of
every ten dollars of wage increases. In contrast, low-wage workers living in upper income
households—those with income at least three times the poverty line, or $43,029 for a family of four in
1992—received 36 percent of the wage hike associated with the minimum wage increase. Even when low
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wage workers living in near-poor households—those households with income less than 150 percent of the
poverty line—are included only about three of every ten dollars of the wage gains from the 1989
Amendments are shown to be captured by the poor or near-poor. Upper income households received more of
the increased earnings from the minimum wage increase than did poor and near poor households.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, minorities were not overwhelmingly helped by this minimum
wage boost. Only 15 percent of the gains from the minimum wage hike went to blacks and only 6 percent
to blacks living in poverty. For every dollar going to a poor black worker living in poverty, more than
five dollars went to upper income non-black households. Members of another vulnerable group often
thought to be helped by minimum wage hikes are female-headed households with children. While these
households did benefit from the minimum wage hike—28 percent of all wage gains went to such households—
as we will see, the size of the gain is modest when compared to the gains from the EITC.
Who Gained From Increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (1989-1992)
The Earned Income Tax Credit was enacted in 1975 to offset the Social Security payroll tax
payments of low-income workers with children. Because it is meant to offset social security taxes and
not federal income taxes, it is paid to workers even if the credit exceeds their federal income tax
payments. Indeed, for the majority of EITC recipients their credit does exceed their federal income
tax payments. As shown in Table 4, the credit as originally enacted equalled 10 percent of the first
$4,000 of labor earnings. This provided a low-income worker with a maximum of $400 per tax unit. The
credit began to phase out at a rate of 10 cents on the dollar for adjusted gross incomes above $4,000
and was entirely phased out at incomes above $8,000. By 1992 the basic EITC rate had increased to 17.6
percent for workers with one qualifying child and 18.4 percent for workers with more than one
qualifying child. (Those with an infant child received an additional 5.0 percent gain.) The maximum
basic EITC was $1,324 (17.4 percent of $7,520) for taxpayers with one child and $1,384 (18.4 percent of
$7,520) for taxpayers with more than one child. In 1992, the EITC began to be phased out at $11,840 at
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a rate of 12.57 cents per dollar for those with one child and a rate of 13.14 percent for those with two
or more children. All benefits are phased out at $22,370. (For a fuller discussion of the EITC see
U.S. House of Representatives, 1992.)
In 1989 the minimum wage was $3.35 per hour. The 1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act increased those wages to $4.25 by 1992 for all workers regardless of the economic circumstances of
their household. Essentially, the EITC can be thought of as providing a selective "minimum wage"
boost. The EITC effectively increases the minimum wage received by low-wage workers who live in low
income households with children.8 Thus, one can see that in 1989 an eligible minimum wage worker who
lived in a household with income below $7,520 actually received $3.82 for an hour's work—$3.35 plus a
14 percent credit.
But as Table 4, shows between 1989 and 1992, Congress increased the EITC marginal credit rates
from 14 to 17.6 (18.4) percent for eligible workers with one (two or more) child. Hence, even if the
1989 FLSA Amendments were not adopted, EITC eligible minimum wage workers would still have seen their
hourly wages grow to $3.94 for a household with one child and $3.97 for a household with more than one
child. Obviously, over this period, the EITC was an alternative method of raising the wages of low
wage workers with children who live in poor households.
In Table 5 we simulate how the gains from changes in the EITC between 1989 and 1992 would have
been allocated across households with different incomes in the absence of the 1989 amendments to the
FLSA. Consistent with the data in Table 3, in our EITC simulation we ignore all behavioral effects and
assume the EITC has no effect on the number of workers employed or on the number of hours they worked.
Column 2 of Table 5 shows that such EITC increases would have cost taxpayers $4.2 billion.
Column 4 shows how those benefits were distributed across different income levels. Workers living at
or near the poverty line (income-to-needs ratios below 1.5) received 63 percent of all dollars from the
EITC. In contrast to the 1989 minimum wage hike in which upper income households gained more than poor
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households, EITC increases provided ten times as many benefits to workers in poor households than to
workers in upper income households. The EITC increased earnings of poor households by 1.2 billion with
a total of 2.6 billion going to poor as well as near-poor households. In contrast the minimum wage
increase to $4.25 increased the earnings of poor households by only $0.7 billion with a total of only
$1.3 billion to poor and near-poor households.
Not only did more of the total dollars from and EITC increase flow to poor and near-poor
households, more of these dollars also went to groups which have been the specific target of social
policy. Blacks received 21 percent of all EITC benefit hikes, 40 percent more than they received from
the higher minimum wage. Blacks living in poverty received 8 percent, a one-third increase over that
provided by the minimum wage hike. Furthermore, for every dollar going to a poor black worker living
in poverty, only $.38 went to upper income non-black households. This is a complete reversal of the
relationship between the shares going to poor and upper income households that we found with respect to
the minimum wage. Single female-headed families received 40 percent of all EITC credits but only 28
percent of the minimum wage hike.
Future Policies for Rewarding the Working Poor
The previous section demonstrated how the dramatic transformations in the work force that have
taken place over the past half century diminished the value of minimum wage legislation as a policy
tool for helping the working poor. Because the link between low wages and low household income is now
almost completely broken, it makes little policy sense to use wages as a proxy for income status in our
attempts to improve the economic well-being of workers living in poor households. Nor is the minimum
wage a particularly good mechanism for aiding minorities or single female-headed households. But,
what must surely ring the death knell for minimum wage policy as a mechanism for transferring income to
the working poor is the rise of the Earned Income Tax Credit. The EITC is a far superior mechanism for
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raising the minimum wage of workers in low income household without directly affecting the wages of
those in higher income households.
As discussed earlier, the 1989 Amendments to the FLSA have been criticized as not going far
enough in raising the wages of the working poor. In a July 20, 1993 memorandum to President Clinton,
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich advocated an increase in the minimum wage as a means of helping poor
people. Clearly, the lessons of the 1989 Amendments have not been learned.
In this section we provide further evidence of the folly of using minimum wage legislation to
redistribute income to the working poor by calculating how the labor earnings gain from an increase in
the minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.00 per hour would be allocated across households with different
incomes. Raising the minimum wage to $5.00 would peg it at one-half the average private sector wage in
1992. Once again we simplify the analysis by assuming no behavioral changes. Hence, increases in
wages are assumed to have no effect on the number of workers employed or on the number of hours they
work. We once again use data from the 1990 Current Population Survey, this time to estimate baseline
income in the presence of both a $4.25 minimum wage and 1992 EITC rules. (See the Appendix for a fuller
discussion of these values.)
Column 2 of Table 6 shows that a minimum wage increase to $5.00 would cost $9.7 billion in added
labor expenses. This is considerably more expensive than the previous increase because a much greater
share of the labor force would be affected by this wage hike. Once again, a minimum wage hike would be
of some benefit to low wage workers living in poverty. But, as can be seen in column 4 of Table 6,
workers living in poor households will receive only 14 percent of the increase, an even smaller share
than they received from the 1989 Amendments. In contrast, low wage workers living in upper income
households will receive 34 percent of the wage hike. The share going to poor and near-poor—27
percent—is also lower than last time. Blacks would once again receive 15 percent of all increases, but
poor blacks would receive only 4 percent. For every dollar going to a poor black worker living in

14
poverty, nearly eight dollars would go to upper income non-blacks. Single female-headed households
would also receive a smaller share of the benefits than last time—25 percent.

How the 1993 Changes in the EITC Will Affect the Poor

We have shown that raising the minimum wage to $5.00 would be a costly policy, with most of its
rewards being captured by non-poor households. These results suggest that using 1930s remedies to
treat the working poor of the 1990s is, at best, questionable public policy. This is even more the
case given the dramatic increases in the EITC which are scheduled to be phased in over the next years.
In evaluating the impact of these changes on the working poor, it is once again useful to consider the
EITC in terms normally reserved for the minimum wage. Minimum wage earners today receive $4.25 per
hour. But once EITC credits under the 1992 rules are considered, those minimum wage workers with
children who actually live in low income households receive a reward for work equal to $5.00 per hour,
$4.25 from their employer plus a $.75 EITC credit. Hence, in 1992 all low income workers with children
who received the minimum wage were already earning the $5.00 per hour wage we are analyzing here. It
will take an additional $9.7 billion in labor costs for a minimum wage hike to achieve this same result
for other, better off, low-wage workers.
Of course any new increases in the minimum wage would even further increase the well-being of
those low wage workers living in low income households by effectively boosting their EITC adjusted
wage even higher. But it would be far less costly to society if policymakers would choose a target wage
or a target amount to be transferred to the working poor and use EITC policy to achieve such explicit
policy goals than to once again return to the outmoded policy of minimum wage hikes.
The expansion and simplification of the earned income tax credit is one of the most significant
piece of social legislation passed by the Clinton Administration to date. Not only does this
legislation greatly increase the size of EITC benefits going to the working poor, but, for the first
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time, those benefits are extended to workers aged 25 to 65 who live in poor households without
children. The full impact of the expansion will not be felt until 1996. In the simulations that follow
we provide a first approximation of how the increased benefits will be distributed using 1996 rules.
To be consistent in making comparisons with Table 6 results, we again use as our benchmark 1989 wage
and income information adjusted to include a $4.25 minimum wage and 1992 EITC rules.
Figure 1 and Table 7 show how the full EITC benefits that will come on line in 1996 will differ
from those in place in 1992. The credit rate will nearly double for poor workers with one child and the
maximum benefit will increase by over 50 percent. The rewards are even greater for poor workers with
two or more children for whom the credit rate will double and the maximum benefit will more than double
from $1,384 to $3,033. The phase out rates are increased modestly and the income at which all benefits
are lost is increased. Increases of this magnitude in the EITC credit rate will have dramatic effects
on the returns to work for low income workers with children. For an eligible worker earning the
minimum wage of $4.25 per hour, their wage including the credit will jump to $5.70 per hour if they have
one eligible child and to $5.78 per hour for those with more than one child.
The EITC benefits for those with no children are substantially more modest. The credit is only
7.65 percent and the maximum benefit is $306. For eligible workers without children and earning the
minimum wage, their wage, including the credit, would be $4.58.
In column 2 of Table 8 we show that applying 1996 EITC rules to workers in households with
children in 1989 would have cost taxpayers an additional $10.8 billion, very close to the $9.7 billion
estimated from increasing the minimum wage to $5.00. (Table 7A in the appendix shows that the total
estimated cost of the 1996 program would be close to $20 billion.) Column 4 shows how those benefits
will be distributed across the income distribution. Workers living in or near poverty will receive
nearly two-thirds of all benefits. In contrast to a minimum wage hike to $5.00, in which upper income
households would gain more than poor households, the EITC increases will provide 17 times more income
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to workers in poor households than to workers in upper income households. Blacks will receive 21
percent of all benefits, and poor blacks 9 percent. In contrast, blacks would receive only 15 percent
of a minimum wage hike to $5.00, and poor blacks only 4 percent. Single female headed households will
receive 40 percent of the EITC increase but only 25 percent of the minimum wage increase.
We perform a similar simulation of the effect of the 1996 rules on eligible workers without
children. Column 2 of Table 9 shows that the new benefits for such workers are much more modest in
scope. They will cost $617 million. The poor and near-poor would receive three-quarters of these
benefits. Blacks would receive 16 percent, and poor blacks 8 percent.
Conclusions
Support for the minimum wage has not only been a litmus test for politicians seeking the
support of organized labor, but has also been seen by the public at large as a socially just exercise of
government regulatory power. Criticism of minimum wage policy has primarily centered on its negative
effects on employment. Economists have long argued that while increasing the minimum wage made low
wage workers who remained on the job better off, it made those workers who were not hired or who lost
their jobs because of it, worse off.
This paper suggests an additional reason for abandoning the minimum wage as a policy for social
change. We have shown that there is no longer a strong connection between the hourly wages a worker
earns and the economic well-being of his or her household. Hence, public policies that use an
individual's wage rate as a mechanism to redistribute income will be wildly inaccurate in the
distribution of those benefits. We showed that the 1989 Amendments to the FLSA which increased the
minimum wage from $3.35 to $4.25 per hour yielded more income for low-wage workers living in upper
income households than it did for low wage workers who lived in poor households. We then simulated the
results of increasing the minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.00 per hour and found the returns across the
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income distribution to be even more heavily weighted toward workers who live in upper income
households.
The Earned Income Tax Credit offers an alternative method of increasing the returns to work for
people who live in low income households. It was much more effective in targeting income to those
workers most in need of income support than was the minimum wage hike during the period 1989 to 1992.
And the 1993 expansion of the EITC, which will phase in by 1996, will more effectively target
additional income on low wage workers in or near poverty than any new hikes in the minimum wage. Even
with no increase in the $4.25 minimum wage, workers in EITC eligible households with one child will
effectively earn $5.70 per hour and those with two or more children will earn $5.78 per hour. The great
majority—75 percent— of these EITC-based expenditures will go to poor or near-poor workers. Only a
small fraction, 2 percent, will go to upper income workers. Blacks will receive 21 percent of all
benefits and female-headed families will receive 40 percent of all benefits. Hence, on income
distribution grounds, the EITC program is clearly superior to further increases in the minimum wage.
But there are two additional reasons to permanently displace the minimum wage with the EITC as
the policy tool of choice for increasing the effective earnings of low-income workers. The first
reason recognizes the traditional economist's criticism of the behavioral effects of the minimum wage.
At best, increasing the minimum wage will have no negative affect on employment. But, in fact, most
empirical studies have found that hikes in the minimum wage reduce employment. And in the case of
teenagers, the unemployment effect can be substantial. The EITC has no direct negative effect on the
demand for labor since benefits are paid through the tax system rather than as mandated expenses paid
by employers. For very low income workers, the EITC is likely to increase their desire to work since it
supplements private wages with a government credit. At higher incomes, when the credit phase out
begins, however, the EITC acts like a tax and will discourage work. Additional study is necessary to
test the behavioral effects of the EITC on the overall supply of labor.9 But there can be no doubt that
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per dollar generated for poor or near-poor families, the reduced employment effect of the EITC will be
substantially less than that caused by a minimum wage hike.
A second and more fundamental issue centers on the factors causing low wages to be paid in the
first place and who is responsible for providing more resources to those earning low wages. Many early
Twentieth Century social reformers argued that low wages were caused by an unequal distribution of
power in the hands of big business. Thus, it was necessary for government to ensure a living wage for
workers. Few believe that an "unlevel playing field" is the principal reason some American workers
still earn wages below $5.00 per hour in the 1990s.
The fact is that for most low wage workers today, their current wages represent the actual
value of the product they produce for the firms who hire them. Rather than large corporations, the
vast majority of these employers are smaller firms which operate in highly competitive
markets—restaurants, retail sales, etc. It is difficult to argue that such firms have sufficient
market power to pay below competitive wages to their workers. Nonetheless, for those low wage workers
who live in or near poverty, especially those who are raising children, there are compelling social
reasons to provide them and their families with greater income until they acquire the education,
skills, and training to earn higher wages on their own. And most Americans would prefer to provide
this help in a way that encouraged work. Hence, transfer payments tied to wages are a much more popular
policy for providing additional resources to low income families with children than are welfare
programs like Aid for Dependent Children.
Both the minimum wage and the EITC succeed in providing the working poor with higher effective
wages than they would have received in the absence of these programs. As we have shown, by increasing
the wage of workers regardless of their individual circumstances, the minimum wage is a far more costly
method of shifting income to the working poor. But more fundamentally it is not obvious why employers
should bear the burden of redistributing income to the working poor.
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Ironically, perhaps the last great barrier to the shift to a complete EITC approach to
providing additional income to the working poor is an unwillingness of Congress to directly confront
the cost of this transfer goals. Even though a minimum wage policy is inferior to the EITC on both
behavioral and income distributional grounds, raising the minimum wage allows Congress to achieve
"morality on the cheap" by shifting the cost of this redistribution off the government books and onto
employers and their customers. But as this paper has demonstrated, the social costs for this sleightof-hand trick are formidable. The minimum wage, the great hope of social reformers of the early
Twentieth Century, has turned out to be the wrong remedy for the working poor of our time. While it is
appropriate to recognize the historical significance of the social struggle for a minimum wage, it is
time to stop paying homage to the past and use the EITC as the mechanism for providing temporary aid to
the working poor until they acquire the skills necessary to earn "a living wage" on their own.

TABLE 1
THE DISTRIBUTION OF LOW-WAGE WORKERS ACROSS THE
INCOME DISTRIBUTION: 1939-1989
(in percentage)
1939a
Income-to-Needs Ratio

Heads of
Householdsc

1949b
All
Workersd

Heads of
Householdsc

1959
All
Workersd

Heads of
Householdsc

All
Workersd

100
0321
94

100
05
2
4
3
85

100
18
3
6
5
77

NA

100
11
47
9
8
61

100
10
16
12
42

households

34

---

31

---

29

---

poor households

31

---

24

---

18

---

2.00
1.50
1.25
1.00
3.00
Total
to
2.99
1.99
1.49
1.24
above
Less or
Percent
than
of1.00
all low-wage
(poor)
workers who were heads of:

1969

1979

1989

Less than 1.00 (poor)

45

23

37

20

37

22

1.00 to 1.24

13

9

13

7

13

9

1.25 to 1.49

9

7

9

7

10

8

1.50 to 1.99

11

14

13

12

12

12

2.00 to 2.99

13

20

16

20

15

19

3.00 or above

10

27

12

34

13

30

100

100

100

100

100

100

households

25

---

21

---

22

---

poor households

11

---

8

---

8

---

Total
Percent of all low-wage
workers who were heads of:

a

Income-to-needs ratio in 1939 excludes income from sources other than wages and salaries (see appendix).
Data for 1949 are not entirely comparable with those from later censuses due to different sampling procedures. Data for
all workers and other household members are not available for 1949. (See the appendix).
c
Working Head-of-Households are defined as heads under age 65. Low-wage workers earned less than half of the average
private-sector wage. All data relate to the year preceding the census or survey. Poverty levels for 1939, 1949 and 1959 were
formed by extrapolation using the Consumer Price Index. Details may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
d
Tabulations include all workers aged 17 to 64, whether living alone or in households. The former are classified by the
ratio of total personal income to the poverty level for one-person households; workers in households are classified by the ratio
of total household income to the size-adjusted poverty level for their household. Comparable data were not gathered in the
1950 census.
Source: Update and compilation of tables from Burkhauser and Finegan (1989).
b

TABLE 2
VALUES OF R2 BETWEEN HOURLY WAGES AND HOUSEHOLD
INCOME-TO-NEEDS RATIOS FOR WORKERS EARNING LESS
THAN THE MEDIAN WAGE: 1939-1989a
Values of R2 for:

Year

Median Wage

Heads of
Households

Other Household
Members

Unrelated
Individuals

All
Workers

1939b

$0.48

.241

.204

.667

.207

1949c

1.45

.188

NA

.573

NA

1959

2.05

.174

.191

.547

.130

1969

3.12

.144

.106

.534

.078

1979

5.84

.114

.062

.552

.046

1989

9.19

.122

.054

.414

.053

a

Workers in the bottom 1 percent of the wage distribution were dropped each year. All correlation
coefficients are positive and significant at the .99 level.
b
Income-to-needs ratios in 1939 exclude income from sources other than wages and salaries (see
Appendix).
c
Owing to unusual sampling procedures in the 1950 Census (see Appendix), data for all workers and
other family members are not available for 1949.
Source: Updated table from Burkhauser and Finegan (1993).

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE INCOME INCREASES DUE TO AN INCREASE
IN THE MINIMUM WAGE FROM $3.35 TO $4.25a

Distribution of Benefits
(percentage)

Income-to-Needs
Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Total
Benefit
($ billion)

Mean Benefit
Per Household
($)

Total

Blacks

NonBlacks

Single FemaleHeaded
Households

$0.7

$874

17

6

11

11

1.00 to 1.25

0.2

760

5

1

4

2

1.25 to 1.50

0.4

786

9

2

7

2

1.50 to 2.00

0.5

728

12

2

10

5

2.00 to 3.00

0.9

760

21

2

19

5

Greater than 3.00

1.5

745

36

3

33

3

$4.2

$769

100

15

85

28

All Households
a

Simulation assumes hours worked in 1989 remained the same under the new minimum and those earning below
$3.00 per hour were employed in a job not covered by minimum wage rules. The cost of the 1989 Amendment would
be much higher if they were extended to all low wage workers. (See Appendix Table 1A for the cost of increasing the
minimum to $4.25 but including those earning less than $3.00 per hour.)
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 4
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PARAMETERS, 1975-92a
Phaseout Range
Credit Rate
(percent)b

Minimum Income for
Maximum Credit

Phaseout Rate
(percent)

Beginning
Income

Ending
Income

1975-78

10

$4,000

$400

10.00

$4,000

$8,000

1979-80

10

5,000

500

12.50

6,000

10,000

1981-84

10

5,000

500

12.50

6,000

10,000

1985-86

11

5,000

550

12.22

6,500

11,000

1987

14

6,080

851

10.00

6,920

15,432

1988

14

6,240

874

10.00

9,840

18,576

1989

14

6,500

910

10.00

10,240

19,340

1990

14

6,810

953

10.00

10,730

20,264

One child

16.7

7,140

1,192

11.93

11,250

21,250

Two or more children

17.3

7,140

1,235

12.36

11,250

21,250

One child

17.6

7,520

1,324

12.57

11,840

22,370

Two children

18.4

7,520

1,384

13.14

11,840

22,370

Additional infant child credit

5.0

7,520

376

3.57

11,840

22,370

Calendar Year

Maximum
Credit

1991:

1992:

Source: U.S. House of Representatives (1992).

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS FROM EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PROGRAM FROM 1989 TO 1992

Distribution of Benefits
(percentage)
Total Benefit
($ billion)

Mean Benefit Per
Household
($)

Total

Blacks

Non-Blacks

Single FemaleHeaded Households

$1.2

$338

30

8

22

12

1.00 to 1.25

0.7

486

17

3

14

5

1.25 to 1.50

0.7

455

16

3

13

6

1.50 to 2.00

0.9

410

21

4

17

9

2.00 to 3.00

0.5

321

13

2

11

7

Greater than 3.00

0.1

359

3

0

3

2

$4.2

$386

100

21

79

40

Income-to-Needs Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Totals
a

Simulation assumes all eligible workers apply for benefits and hours worked in 1989 would remain the same under the 1992 EITC rules.
This table is based on the difference between 1989 data using 1989 EITC rules and 1989 data using 1992 EITC rules. (See Appendix Table
2A and 2B.)
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE INCOME INCREASES DUE TO AN INCREASE IN THE
MINIMUM WAGE FROM $4.25 TO $5.00a

Distribution of Benefits
(percentage)

Total Benefit
($ billion)

Mean Benefit Per
Household
($)

Total

Blacks

Non-Blacks

Single FemaleHeaded Households

$1.4

$1,065

14

4

10

9

1.00 to 1.25

0.6

1,008

6

1

5

2

1.25 to 1.50

0.7

1,142

7

1

6

2

1.50 to 2.00

1.4

1,056

15

3

12

4

2.00 to 3.00

2.3

1,045

24

3

21

5

Greater than 3.00

3.3

922

34

3

31

3

$9.7

$1,008

100

15

85

25

Income-to-Needs Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Totals
a

Simulation assumes hours worked in 1989 would remain the same under a new minimum and those earning below $3.00 per hour are
employed in a job not covered by minimum wage rules.
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 7
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PARAMETERS IN 1992 AND 1996

Rules

Credit Rate
(percent)b

Minimum Income
for Maximum
Credit

1992

17.6

$7,520

1996

34.0

1992

Phaseout Range
Maximum
Credit

Phaseout Rate
(percent)

Beginning
Income

Ending
Income

$1,324

12.57

$11,840

$22,370

6,000

2,040

15.78

11,000

23,766

18.4

7,520

1,384

13.14

11,840

22,370

1996

36.0

8,425

3,033

20.22

11,000

27,002

1992

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4,000

306

7.65

5,000

9,000

One child

Two children

No children
1996

7.65

Source: Congressional Record (1993)

TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF INCREASED BENEFITS FROM EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
PROGRAM CHANGE FROM 1992 TO 1996 FOR THOSE WITH CHILDRENa

Distribution of Benefits
(percentage)

Total Benefit
($ billion)

Mean Benefit Per
Household
($)

Total

Blacks

Non-Blacks

Single FemaleHeaded Households

$3.75

$1,012

35

9

27

15

1.00 to 1.25

1.74

1,189

16

3

13

6

1.25 to 1.50

1.62

1,069

15

3

12

5

1.50 to 2.00

2.24

765

21

3

16

7

2.00 to 3.00

1.18

485

11

2

8

6

Greater than 3.00

0.26

505

2

0

3

1

$10.80

$856

100

21

79

40

Income-to-Needs Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Totals
a

Simulation assumes all eligible workers apply for benefits and hours worked in 1989 would remain the same under the 1996 EITC rules.
This table is based on the difference between 1989 data assuming a $4.25 per hour minimum wage and using 1992 EITC rules and 1989 data
assuming a $4.25 per hour minimum wage and using 1996 EITC rules. (See Appendix Table 3A and 4A.)
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF INCREASED BENEFITS FROM EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT CHANGE FROM 1992 TO 1996
FOR THOSE WITHOUT CHILDRENa

Income-to-Needs
Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Total Benefit
($ billion)

Mean Benefit
Per Household
($)

Distribution of Benefits
(percentage)
Total

Blacks

Non-Blacks

$0.33

$181

53

8

45

1.00 to 1.25

0.09

122

14

2

12

1.25 to 1.50

0.05

108

8

2

6

1.50 to 2.00

0.05

154

8

1

7

2.00 to 3.00

0.07

156

11

2

9

Greater than 3.00

0.04

142

6

1

5

$0.62

$155

100

16

84

Totals
a

Simulation assumes all eligible workers apply for benefits and hours worked in 1989 would
remain the same under the 1996 EITC rules. This table is based on the difference between 1989 data
assuming a $4.25 per hour minimum wage and using 1992 EITC rules and 1989 data assuming a
$4.25 per hour minimum wage and using 1996 EITC rules. (See Appendix Table 3A and 4A.)
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.
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APPENDIX

In this appendix we discuss more fully our data and estimation procedures, and assess the
comparability of our earnings distributions over time.

Estimating Average Hourly Earnings from Census Data

We had to estimate hourly earnings from responses to questions on annual earnings, weeks
worked, and hours worked. In 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970, working respondents were asked only the
number of hours they had worked during the census week, and their answers were reported only in
intervals (i.e., 1-14 hours, 15-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40, 41-48, 49-59, and 60 or more). In 1980, the
census recorded numerical responses to this question and to a new one on usual hours worked during
1979. We estimated the relationship between usual hours and census-week hours by age and sex during
1979-80. We then assigned group-specific means of usual hours in 1979 to each census-week hours
interval in all four censuses. Similarly the census tabulated weeks worked responses only by
intervals prior to 1980 (i.e., 1-13, 14-26, 27-39, 40-47, 48-49, and 50-52), but recorded numerical
responses in 1980. Again, we calculated means for each interval by age and sex for 1980 and used these
means in each census. For wage or salary income in the previous year, each census reported respondents'
estimates in fairly narrow intervals, save for an open-ended upper interval ($10,000 or more in 1950,
$25,000 or more in 1960 and 1970, $75,000 or more in 1980), and assigned midpoint values to each
bounded interval. Because we were mainly interested in identifying low-wage workers and their wages,
we assigned the minimum value of the open-end interval to each worker within it. (This procedure will
bias means downward but should have no effect on the number or wages of low-wage workers.) Finally, we
derived average hourly earnings ("wages," for short) by dividing wage or salary income by the product
of estimated usual hours times estimated weeks worked.
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A key assumption of this procedure is that group-specific means of (a) actual weeks worked
within weeks worked intervals and (b) usual hours worked last year within census week hours intervals
did not change across census years. While this assumption is a strong one, we think this procedure is
more defensible than simply using midpoints of weeks-worked intervals and census-week hours intervals
for all demographic groups. When we cross classified workers in the 1980 census by their census week
hours and usual hours worked, we found a rather loose association, especially for youngsters.
Furthermore, the variance in census-week hours exceeded that in usual hours by so much that the mean
usual hours of those who worked short or long hours during the census week fell outside the census-week
interval for many age-sex groups. Use of census-week midpoints could therefore introduce a downward
bias in annual hours, and hence an upward bias in wages, for those groups with predominantly downward
disturbances in census week hours. The opposite bias might occur for prime-age males, who probably
work overtime more often than short hours. Likewise, we also found consistent differences between the
midpoints and group-specific means of weeks-worked intervals. Thus, group-specific means of usual
hours and weeks worked appear to be the better estimators.
Finally, as noted in the text, a difference in sampling procedures reduces the comparability
of some statistics from the 1950 census with those from later censuses and explains why other data are
not available for the earlier year. In all census years except 1950, data on earnings, hours worked,
and the like have been collected for all workers in a sample of households. But in 1950, such data were
gathered from a cross-household sample of individual respondents, and total family income was reported
only on the records of family heads. As a result, (a) workers in large families were oversampled in the
1950 census, and (b) we cannot determine the poverty status of low-wage workers who were members of
families but not heads. An experiment with the 1960 census suggests that the oversampling of large
family heads in 1950 led to a substantial overstatement of the 1950 poverty rate for nonelderly
families headed by such workers, as reported in Table 1. In this experiment we found a strong positive
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association among families headed by very low-wage workers in 1960 between family size and the
incidence of poverty. Specifically, the poverty rate was 48 percent for such families with two or
three members, 67 percent for those with four members, and 83 percent for those with five members or
more. There is every reason to think that the same kind of relationship prevailed in 1950.
Furthermore, this sampling bias must have caused us to underestimate the fraction of low-wage workers
who were heads of families in 1950, relative to later censuses. None of these inconsistencies impairs
the validity of the longer-period trends shown in the tables.

Estimating Wages from CPS Data

There are two kinds of earnings data in the March 1990 file of the Current Population Survey
and our use of each has been explained in the text. In Tables 1 and 2 we used the retrospective data
from the CPS to estimate a worker's usual hourly earnings in 1989 by dividing the wage or salary
earnings reported for that year by the product of weeks worked times usual hours worked per week that
year. To test the comparability of census and CPS retrospective earnings data for 1979, we calculated
the fraction of low-wage workers who fell below the poverty line in the 1980 census and in the March
1980 CPS. The two fractions were 20 percent and 16 percent, respectively. While some of the
difference may be sampling error, we think that more flows from an overstatement of the poverty rate in
census data due to greater under-reporting of earnings and other income. By contrast, CPS data are
collected by trained interviewers and are recorded as exact numbers, not as checked intervals; so the
retrospective CPS wage rates should be somewhat firmer than those from the censuses.

Description of the Minimum Wage Simulation Procedure

As discussed above, we used the retrospective data from the 1990 CPS to estimate the hourly
wage of each worker in our first two tables because we wanted to make our CPS data as compatible as
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possible with our census data. But for our simulations we choose to use the more accurate current CPS
data. From outgoing rotation groups (one-quarter of the sample of households), each month's CPS
collects data on workers' usual gross weekly earnings in their primary job and how many hours per week
they usually work at that job. Workers who are paid by the hour are asked how much they earn per hour.
These data are better suited than retrospective data for simulating the effects of a rise in the
minimum wage because no recollection of the previous year's earnings is required. For the ex ante
distribution of hourly earnings in our simulations we used the reported hourly wage rate for hourly
paid workers and the ratio of usual weekly earnings to usual hours worked for others in 1990. All
income data, however, comes from retrospective information from 1989.
Because we are matching March 1990 wage rates to 1989 income there is a possibility of
mismatches with "true" 1989 wages. To minimize these mismatches we exclude workers whose industry or
occupation on their current job in 1990 was different from that on his or her primary job in 1989. We
also excluded those who had moved.
We established several screens to determine who in our sample would be eligible for increases
in the minimum wage. Initially we eliminated all self-employed persons, workers over the age of 64,
and members of the armed services. The next step was to eliminate any worker who reported average
hours per week to be less than 15 or who reported working fewer than 14 weeks during the year. We did
not attempt to use any combination of occupation/industry screens, but rather used a wage screen
(described below) to eliminate workers from our sample.
We simulated the increase in the minimum wage first using $4.25 as the minimum in keeping with
the 1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. We then used the measure of one-half of the
average private sector wage, which was $5.00 in 1992 as our minimum. All workers in our sample with an
estimated wage below these minimums were eligible to receive an increase in their wage in our
simulations. Before attributing this increase to the sample we performed two adjustments. First all
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workers with estimated wages below $3.00 per hour were assumed to be working in an uncovered job and
hence, ineligible for benefits. Second, all workers whose estimated wage per hour was below the pre1989 minimum of $3.35 in the 1989 simulations but above $3.00, were assumed to be actually receiving
the minimum wage and their estimated wage was changed to $3.35 in the 1989 sample. In our simulation
raising the minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.00 per hour, we assumed all eligible workers in 1989 were
already receiving $4.25 per hour.
Once the appropriate sample of covered low-wage workers was determined, we estimated the
increase in yearly income accruing to each low-wage worker due to an increase in the minimum wage.
This was done by multiplying the difference between our proposed minimum and the estimated current
wage by the product of hours per week and weeks per year.
The minimum wage is targeted on individuals, but individuals live in households. It is the
household which is the unit of analysis for economic well-being. Therefore, in making comparisons
with the Earned Income Tax Credit, our focus is on the household unit. While only one tax credit per
household is allowed under the EITC program, it may be the case that many members of a household would
receive benefits under an increase in the minimum wage. This should be kept in mind when comparing the
mean benefit per household of the two programs.

Description of Earned Income Tax Credit Simulation Procedure

Our general approach to estimating the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was to apply, within the
limitations inherent in the data, the EITC program rules as specified by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). We have the actual program rules for 1989 and 1992, however they do not exist for 1996.
Therefore we used 1992 rules for our 1996 simulations, changing only those provisions explicitly
outlined in the recently passed legislation. Since most of the simulations involve 1992 rules, this
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appendix will describe the 1992 simulation procedure with comments on how 1989 or 1996 rules differ
where applicable.
Since the target population of the EITC is low-income households with children who have some
earned income, we used data from the Current Population Survey, March 1990 file. This file contains
retrospective data on earnings and household characteristics for 1989. The structure of this data set
is ideal for studies which focus on households since it contains extensive household data in addition
to personal data on every individual in the household.
Given that there are effectively two sets of EITC eligibility criteria, our simulations
followed a two-step procedure. The first set of criteria examines household characteristics to
determine eligibility for the program. The second set uses income measures to establish the size of the
credit for those eligible households (which will be zero in many cases). An important distinction to
bear in mind is that while the unit of analysis for the eligibility criteria is the household, the
federal income tax filing unit is the measure for the income criteria. In most cases these will not be
the same, as many households file more than one tax return.
Household Eligibility.

Household eligibility depends upon the presence of what the IRS

defines as a "qualifying child." Whether or not an individual in the household is a qualifying child
depends upon three tests. In particular, these tests are (1) relationship, (2) age, and (3) residency.
The relationship test requires that a qualifying child be a direct descendent, either natural,
adopted, or through marriage, (e.g., son, grandchild, stepdaughter, etc.), of someone in the
household. Additionally a foster child may meet the relationship test provided the child lived with
the household for the entire year.
The age test requires that the child be under age 19 at the end of the tax year. This age
restriction is increased to 24 if the child is a full-time student and it is eliminated altogether if
the child is totally or permanently disabled.
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The residency test requires that the child live in the main home of the household (which must
be in the United States) for more than six months of the year (twelve months for a foster child). Any
child who is born into the household or who dies during the tax year is exempt from this test.
In our simulations only the relationship and age tests were applied to determine if a
qualifying child resided in the household. We ignored the residency test because in cases where the
residency test is not met in the data, it follows that the parent or person who does match with the
qualifying child is out of the data set. In order to not lose the observation completely, we use the
current household data available in the CPS for that child as a proxy for the missing data.
With the data available in the CPS, both the relationship and age tests can be applied in a
straight-forward manner. The only exception is the disabled child who has no age restriction. The CPS
survey only asks respondents whether or not they were unable to work at any time during the previous
year because of health problems, and does not ask about disabilities directly. Thus, we did not
attempt to identify permanently disabled children.
Once the age and relationship tests are met by a child in the household, then the family is
considered to be eligible for the program in the simulation. The next step then is to apply the income
tests to the appropriate tax-filing unit within the household.
Only one tax-filing unit within a household may claim the earned income tax credit. That is,
only one credit is available per household. However, as will be discussed below, the age and number of
qualifying children can affect the size of the credit under 1992 rules (but not under 1989 rules). In
most cases finding this sub-group within the household is straight-forward as it will be either the
married couple or single parent who heads the family. Larger family structures that span more than two
generations requires more analysis however.
The IRS requires that married couples file a joint return in order to be eligible for the
earned income tax credit. In our simulations we assume all married couples file jointly. The vast
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majority of married couples file jointly, and the incentives to file separately are going to be
strongest at higher income levels. Thus, given that low-income households dominate the sample of
eligible households any bias due to this assumption should be small.
Single head households pose no special problems as far as tax filing status is concerned. In
fact, even if the qualifying child cannot be claimed as an exemption by a single head (e.g., the former
spouse who pays child support claims the exemption), the head will still receive the earned income
credit as long as the residency test is met.
Multiple-generation households will generally have more than one tax filing unit which can
claim the qualifying child. In these situations the IRS has two rules to determine who gets the
credit. The first rule is that tax filers who are qualifying children cannot themselves be eligible
for the earned income credit. For example, an 18 year old mother, with a qualifying child(s) of her
own, but who lives with her parents is ineligible to receive the earned income credit since she is a
qualifying child herself. In this case the parents will receive the earned income credit (if any)
based on the 18 year old mother being the qualifying child in the family.
The second rule applies when more than one tax filing unit can claim the qualifying child. In
this case the tax filing unit with the higher adjusted gross income will be the one to claim the earned
income credit. In the above example, if the mother was 20 years old instead of 18 she would no longer
be a qualifying child herself as she fails to pass the age test. In this case her children now become
the qualifying children for the household and both she and her parents can potentially claim the earned
income credit. Whomever has the higher adjusted gross income between the two will receive the credit.
The second rule was used for all cases of multi-generational households in the 1992
simulations (1989 rules differ and will be discussed below). The first rule is much rarer than the
second in the data, and given that multi-generational households only comprise around 5 percent of the
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CPS households, we felt little would be gained by attempting to incorporate the first rule (which would
be computationally difficult).
As noted, the above discussion on the two tie-breaking rules for multi-generational households
applies only to 1992. Prior to 1991 the IRS placed more restrictions on the filing status of single
persons with a qualifying child. Specifically the person had to file as head of household or as a
qualifying widow or widower. Therefore in the 1989 simulations, in instances where more than two tax
filing units could claim the qualifying child, we always used the head of the family (and spouse if
present) as the appropriate tax filing unit and did not use the higher adjusted gross income tiebreaker rule. In the examples described above, the young mother would not be able to file as the
"single head of household," regardless of her age, as long as she resided with her parents.
For the 1996 simulations, we use a two-step household eligibility process. We applied the 1992
household eligibility rules described above to select the sample of families with qualifying children
(i.e., the exact same sample used in the 1992 simulations). In 1992 families not in this sample are
considered ineligible, but in 1996 they have another route to eligiblity. They may now potentially
qualify for the EITC under the new program which pays benefits to families without qualifying
children, or without any children. This second eligible group will be referred to as families without
children, but in actuality it will contain many different family types—single persons, married couples
without children, and families with children who don't qualify under 1992 rules.
For this second group of families without children, the qualifying child tests described above
no longer apply. Instead we accepted any person who fell between the ages of 25 to 64 inclusive, had at
least $1 in earned income, and was either the head of a household (including single individuals) or a
spouse of a head. Thus, the income tax filing unit which received the credit is always the head of a
household and his/her spouse if married.
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Income Criteria.

Once the appropriate tax filing unit was determined, the income criteria

was applied. In general, even though the CPS has quite detailed income data, any attempt to carry out
actual IRS rules with respect to income will be much less precise than what can be attempted with
respect to the household characteristics rules. Hence, any attempt to simulate the completion of a tax
return will be crude. In actual practice it requires much more information. However, this problem
should be mitigated by the sample population we are dealing with. Low-income households generally
have few (and uncomplicated) income sources.
The two income measures used to calculate the actual EITC credit are (1) wage income and (2)
adjusted gross income. Wage income as defined by the IRS includes the following: wages, salaries,
tips, net earnings from self-employment, union strike benefits, certain long-term disability
benefits, voluntary salary deferrals, combat pay, basic quarters and subsistence allowances from the
United States military, meals or lodging provided by an employer, housing allowance for the clergy,
excludable employer-provided dependent care benefits, and anything else of value (money, goods, or
services) provided for services rendered. In our simulations we only included wages, salaries, tips,
net earnings from self-employment, and union strike benefits. All of the other forms of wage income
are unavailable in the CPS. As a result, our simulated measure of wage income will at times
underestimate the true value (how this effects our results is discussed below). However, we feel that
our estimate of wage income are reasonable. Most of the missing information applies
disproportionately to high income individuals who would not be eligible for the program. Thus, the
absence of this information should have only a small effect on our wage income estimate.
Adjusted gross income starts with wage income as the base and then both adds in other sources
of income and subtracts out various credits. We added the following sources of income into our
simulated measure of adjusted gross income: interest income, dividends, alimony, rental income,
royalties, and unemployment compensation. We did not include taxable refunds of state and local
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income taxes, capital gains or losses, or IRA distributions because this information is unavailable in
the CPS. Additionally adjusted gross income includes certain pension benefits and, in some instances,
social security benefits. We did not include these two sources either as the CPS does not have the
information for one to determine what percentage, if any, of these benefits are taxable. Pension
benefits depend upon the individual's contribution history. The taxpayer receives a Form W-2P in
these instances to help calculate the taxable amount. Social security benefits also requires a form
(SSA-1099) that one can use with a worksheet to find the taxable amount.
We only included one credit adjustment in our measure of adjusted gross income. Namely, onehalf of the self-employment tax can be subtracted out. Other credits not available were IRA
contributions, Keough retirement plan contributions, and alimony paid. Given that adjusted gross
income includes both additions and subtractions, we may at times either underestimate or overestimate
the true value. However, in most cases of missing information, it is likely that underestimation is
the result because most individuals will have additions from other income sources greater than any
credits that they could subtract.
For married couples the wage incomes and adjusted gross incomes of the head and spouse were
added together to get the earned income and the adjusted gross income measures that apply to the
appropriate tax filing unit. In the cases of a single parent who receives the EITC, the individual's
earned income and adjusted gross income are the appropriate measures.
Once the two income measures for the tax filing unit are determined, the actual tax credit can
be calculated. The general picture of the relationship of the tax credit to income can be thought of as
a plateau (see Figure 1A). Referring to Figure 1A, the key parameters are the phase-in and phase-out
rates (s1 and s2 respectively), and the three income points (I1, I2, and I3). If either the earned income
or the adjusted gross income of the appropriate taxfiling unit exceeds I3 (which equaled $19,340 in
1989 and $22,370 in 1992; in 1996 I3 varies by household composition equaling $23,766, $27,002, and
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$9,000 for families with one child, two plus children, and no children respectively—refer to Figure
1), then the family does not receive any tax credit. They are technically ineligible for the program
since they fail the income tests.
For families that have both earned income and adjusted gross income meeting the income test
defined by I3, the next step is to determine which of the two measures should be used to calculate the
size of the credit. As long as adjusted gross income does not exceed I2 (which equaled $10,240 in 1989,
$11,840 in 1992, and $11,000 or $5,000 in 1996 depending upon household composition—refer to Figure
1), then earned income is the appropriate income measures. For adjusted gross income above I2, the
appropriate income measure is the larger ofthe two (i.e., use adjusted gross income when it exceeds
earned income, and use earned income if otherwise).
The phase-in and phase-out rates vary depending upon household composition for 1992 and 1996,
however, they do not vary for 1989. In 1989 a household with one qualifying child of any age would be
subject to the same phase-in and phase-out rates as a family with numerous qualifying children. In
1989 the phase-in rate was 14 percent and the phase-out rate was 10 percent. The minimum income for the
maximum credit (i.e., I1) was $6,500 in 1989. Thus, the maximum credit, or plateau, in 1989 is found by
multiplying $6,500 by 0.14 (equaling $910). After an adjusted gross income level of $10,240 (i.e.,
I2), this maximum credit of $910 is reduced by $0.10 for every extra dollar of income until one reaches
an income level of $19,340 (i.e., I3) where the credit becomes $0.
Starting in 1992 the phase-in and phase-out rates vary for some household (though the three
income marks, I1, I2, and I3 remain the same for everyone). If a household has only one qualifying child
the phase-in and phase-out rates are 17.60 and 12.57 respectively. If that child happens to have been
born in 1992 then these rates increase by 5.00 and 3.57 (thus becoming 22.60 and 16.14) respectively.
If the household has two or more qualifying children then the two rates are 18.40 and 13.14. Once again
if one of these qualifying children was born in 1992 then the rates receive the same 5.00 and 3.57
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increases (resulting in 23.40 and 16.71) as described above. All in all, depending upon numbers and
ages of the children in the household, four rate structures exist. With the minimum income for the
maximum credit being $7,520 in 1992, the maximum credit will be one of four possibilities ranging from
$1,324 to $1,760. These maximums define the four plateaus all having a common range from $7,520 to
$11,840 (I1 to I2). At this point the different phase-out ranges take effect so that they all result in
the tax credit reaching $0 by the time income has increased to $22,370 (I3).
One further note regarding the 1992 rates is in order. There is one additional credit
available that will increase the earned income tax credit for certain households. This credit is the
supplemental health credit and it applies only to individuals who paid, out of his/her own pocket, for
any health premiums which included coverage for the qualifying child(s). The size of the credit is
determined the same way as the basic earned income credit (with phase-in and phase-out rates of 6.0 and
4.3 respectively), however, the credit cannot exceed the actual premium payment itself. Once again,
the CPS does not contain the kind of information to do this calculation. This program is a small and
tangential part of the overall earned income tax credit program and it was dropped in the 1993
Amendments. We ignore it here.
With the newly enacted rules for 1996, the phase-in rate, s1, becomes 34.0, 40.0, and 7.65 for
households with one child, two or more children, or no children, respectively. Similarly the phaseout rate, s2, equals 15.70, 20.22, and 7.65 for those same respective households. The infant bonus
rate is dropped completely for 1996.
The plateau range differs for each type of household in 1996. For households with one child
the plateau (i.e., I1 to I2) spans from $6,000 to $11,000 with a maximum credit of $2,040. For
households with two or more children, I1 is $8,425 and I2 is $11,000 with a maximum credit of $3,033.
For households with no children, I1 is $4,000 and I2 is $5,000 with a maximum credit equal to $306.
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The income test to determine the size of the Earned Income credit for households without
children in 1996 differs somewhat from the procedure used for households. Given that we now have an
age test, practical problems can arise in the case of married couples where only one member of the
couple meets the age test. Without any specific guidelines on how to handle this situation we chose a
conservative route. We use only the earned income of the members who actually meet the age test to
determine the size of the credit. If that measure of earned income exceeds the right end of the plateau
(I2) we then use the larger measure of adjusted gross income or earned income for the entire
households.
Note that this procedure is the same one used for households with children as long as both
members of the couple meet the age test (which is the case for the majority of the sample). However,
for couples where only one member meets the age test, a significant discontinuity can occur with
respect to the calculation of the credit. Before I2 is reached only the earned income of the one member
who meets the age test is counted, but after I2 the entire couples income is wanted.
We first estimated the credit based on the parameters that actually prevailed in 1989 and 1992.
Then we altered the parameters (s1, s2, I1, I2, I3) or the eligibility requirements in accordance with
the newly enacted legislation, and then recalculated the new credit. The difference between our
simulated proposed program and our simulated actual program as it existed is then reported as the
increase to the government of our proposal. This approach was taken for each of the income and
demographic groups. Even though the EITC would actually shift some of the households into higher
income groups, all of our tables keep households in their original (i.e., before tax credit) groups.
One further distinction is necessary with respect to 1989 versus 1992 and 1996. In order to
account for the increase in the minimum wage from $3.35 in 1989 to $4.25 by 1991, we simulated this
increase for low wage workers and built that into our data set for the 1992 and 1996 calculations. Our
description of the process of selecting which workers benefit from the increased minimum wage is
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discussed above. These workers increase in yearly wage income was directly added into their yearly
wage income as reported in the CPS. After this addition, all of the steps proceed as described above.
Finally, a brief discussion of potential biases is in order. As previously mentioned, our
estimates of both wage income and adjusted gross income will be biased downward in some instances. For
households in the phase-in range, only wage income counts. At these income levels our measure of wage
income should be quite good due to our belief in the dearth of complex income sources for these
households. Nevertheless an underestimation of wage income in this region will result in an
underestimation of the cost of the program.
Along the plateau, errors in calculating wage income will be less significant the farther away
the household is from the kink point where the phase-out range begins (I2). Underestimation of wage
income would lead to overestimation of the cost of the program as some households on the plateau may
actually be in the phase-out range.
The phase-out region is where biases will have their greatest effect. In this region, our
estimate of adjusted gross income will generally determine the size of the credit. This measure is
probably less precise as one moves towards the end of the phase-out range. Thus, we are more likely to
overestimate the cost of the program in this region. All in all, our estimate of the overall cost of
the EITC program will probably be overstated if, as data limitations force, we consistently
underestimate the two income measures. Therefore our estimates can be considered a worst case
scenario as far as the expense to the federal government is concerned. The structure of the program is
such that underestimating incomes results in a larger government expense.
It is for this reason that we did not make one common adjustment; namely adjusting for
inflation. Recall that our estimates for 1992 and 1996 are based on 1989 data. Other than the
adjustment for the new minimum wage, we left all other incomes at their 1989 levels. An increase based
on inflation would increase the earned income credit for families in the phase-in range. However, most

44
of these workers would be making the minimum wage we already imposed, and thus should not be affected
by changes in inflation. The inflation effects would be felt instead in the phase-out range where
underestimation of the cost would result. Thus, an adjustment for inflation would almost certainly
reduce our estimate of the cost of the program. As an example, we estimated the cost of the EITC in
1992 both with the adjustment for the minimum wage and without it. As expected the estimated cost
without the increased incomes due to the adjustment was higher by approximately $20 million, a small
amount by government standards. For this reason we chose not to make the inflationary adjustment.

TABLE 1A
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE INCOME INCREASES DUE TO
AN INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE
FROM $3.35 TO $4.25a

Income-to-Needs
Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Total Benefit
($ billion)

Number of
Households
(millions)

Mean Benefit per
Household
($)

Distribution of
Benefits
(percentage)

$1.10

0.891

$1,205

12

1.00 to 1.25

0.72

0.42

1,711

8

1.25 to 1.50

0.75

0.58

1,294

8

1.50 to 2.00

1.33

0.86

1,541

15

2.00 to 3.00

1.82

1.37

1,325

21

Greater than 3.00

3.20

2.54

1,259

36

$8.92

6.69

$1,333

100

Totals
a

Simulation assumes hours worked in 1989 would remain the same under the new minimum and all workers,
regardless of wage earning per hour in 1989 would be eligible to receive $4.25 per hour.
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 2A
DISTRIBUTION OF EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
BENEFITS IN 1989 USING 1989 RULESa

Total Benefit
($ billion)

Number of
Households
(millions)

$2.13

3.62

$589

44.8

1.00 to 1.25

0.85

1.38

618

17.9

1.25 to 1.50

0.66

1.23

532

13.9

1.50 to 2.00

0.68

1.67

405

14.3

2.00 to 3.00

0.32

0.89

356

6.7

Greater than 3.00

0.11

0.27

426

2.3

$4.75

9.06

$524

100.0

Income-to-Needs
Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Totals
a

Mean Benefit per
Household
($)

Distribution of
Benefits
(percentage)

Simulation assumes that all eligible workers apply for benefits and there is no change in work
behavior.
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 3A
DISTRIBUTION OF EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
BENEFITS IN 1989 USING 1992 RULESA

Total Benefit
($ billion)

Number of
Households
(millions)

Mean Benefit per
Household
($)

Distribution of
Benefits
(percentage)

$3.37

3.67

$919

37.8

1.00 to 1.25

1.55

1.44

1,076

17.4

1.25 to 1.50

1.32

1.45

910

14.8

1.50 to 2.00

1.57

2.17

724

17.6

2.00 to 3.00

0.86

1.68

509

9.6

Greater than 3.00

0.25

0.39

628

2.8

$8.92

10.80

$826

100.0

Income-to-Needs
Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Totals
a

Simulation assumes all eligible workers apply for benefits and there is no change in work behavior.
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 4A
DISTRIBUTION OF EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
PROGRAM IN 1989 USING 1996 RULESa

Distribution of Benefits
(percentage)

Total Benefit
($ billion)

Mean Benefit Per
Household
($)

Total

$7.16

$1,911

36

1.00 to 1.25

3.28

2,242

1.25 to 1.50

2.93

1.50 to 2.00

Non-Blacks

Single FemaleHeaded Households

9

27

16

17

3

13

6

1,934

15

3

12

6

3.80

1,297

19

3

16

7

2.00 to 3.00

2.03

834

10

2

8

5

Greater than 3.00

0.51

975

3

0

3

1

$19.70

$1,563

100

21

79

41

Income-to-Needs Ratio
Less than 1.00 (poor)

Totals
a

Blacks

Simulation assumes all eligible workers apply for benefits and there is no change in work behavior.
Source: Estimated from the March 1990 Current Population Survey.
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Endnotes
1.

Recent research by Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card (1992) however, provide some evidence
which challenges this conventional view. Their findings in turn have been challenged by
Neumark and Wascher (1992).

2.

The House version of the Kennedy-Hawkins bill (vetoed by President Bush in 1989) would have
raised the minimum wage to the 50 percent level and indexed it thereafter.

3.

The data here and in subsequent tables come from the 1 percent samples of the 1940 and 1950
census, the 1/1,000 samples of the 1960, 1970, and 1980 censuses, and the March 1990 Current
Population Survey. Except for the wage data used in the simulations, the average hourly
earnings in the year preceding each census or survey was obtained by dividing the respondent's
reported wage or salary income that year by the product of estimated usual weekly hours worked
that year times estimated weeks worked that year. We limited our study to 17-to-64 year old
wage and salary workers who worked at least 14 weeks in the preceding year and at least 15 hours
in the census or survey week. (A detailed summary of estimation procedures and data issues is
presented in the Appendix.)

4.

A household consists of all persons who occupy a housing unit. Families, both single and two
parent, represent by far the most common household type.

5.

See Burkhauser and Finegan (1989) for a fuller discussion of this transformation.

6.

The R2 coefficient shows the proportion of the total variation in household income-to-needs
ratios that can be explained by variations in these low-wage workers' wage rates.

7.

The Fair Labor Standards Act excludes certain workers from coverage. In general, the law
excludes those workers who are employed by firms with less than $500,000 in sales. This
exemption is narrowed by the inclusion of any employee directly or indirectly involved in
interstate commerce (e.g., communications, transportation, as well as those who use the mail,
telephone or telegraph for interstate communication).

8.

Beginning in 1994, the EITC will be extended to workers aged 25 to 65 who live in poor
households without children. The distribution of benefits from those new rules will be
discussed below.

9.

Moore (1993) argues that the phaseout rate that goes into place in the expanded EITC program
may have quite severe work disincentive effects.
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